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JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND 
POSTCONCILIAR FAITH 
THOMAS HUGHSON, S.J. 
[Editor's Note: The author situates his study of Murray against 
the background of recent unfavorable criticism about his stand-
ing in American Catholicism. He then identifies Murray's ap-
proach to faith through an analysis of the notion of "voluntary 
dynamic," locating it within several contexts and showing its 
close relationship to the teaching of Vatican II. Special atten-
tion is given to the council's shift from the freedom of faith to the 
dignity of the believer as image of God.] 
THE VALIDITY of theological reflection on the act and habit of faith cannot be taken for granted. Lutheran-Catholic dialogue has 
drawn attention to an absence of contradiction between Luther's con-
cept of faith as a comprehensive reception of justification and the 
Catholic concept of faith as one of three theological virtues by which 
the justified relate immediately to God.1 If fundamental theology none-
theless proceeds in accord with the Pauline triad of faith, hope, and 
charity, this is not to ignore the intrinsic unity of the Christian way of 
life or to counteract the Lutheran perspective. The three theological 
virtues simply spell out basic modes in one, complete reception of God, 
THOMAS HUGHSON, S.J., received his doctorate in theology at the University of St. 
Michael's College, in the Toronto School of Theology. He is now associate professor of 
systematic theology at Marquette University. His interests lie especially in the area of 
christology and ecclesiology. He has contributed the essay "Murray and the People: A 
Beginning," in John Courtney Murray and the Growth of Tradition, ed. Leon Hooper and 
Todd David Whitmore (Sheed & Ward, 1996). 
1
 See H. George Anderson et al., ed., Justification by Faith: Lutherans and Catholics 
in Dialogue VII (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985). The "Common Statement" remarked 
that "By broadening the definition of faith beyond intellectualistic concepts prevalent in 
modern Scholasticism, the council left open the possibility that faith might include the 
entire response of the faithful to justifying grace" (no. 73, 42). Theologians from the 
Lutheran and the Catholic churches actualized this possibility at the end of their "Com-
mon Statement" when they agreed that "Justifying faith cannot exist without hope and 
love; it necessarily issues in good works. Yet the justified cannot rely on their own good 
works or boast of their own merits...." (no. 156, 71). 
2
 For Pauline and Deuteropauline references, see 1 Thess 1:3; 5:8; Eph 1:15-18; 1 Cor 
13:13; Col 1:4-6; Heb 10:22-24. Dieter Lührmann states that "Paul interprets the triad 
in Rom. 5:1-5 in the sense of his doctrine of justification: justification by faith (5:1), hope 
in the glory of God (5:2), grounded in the gift of God's love (5:5). The three concepts are 
fulfilled, according to their context, through justification" ("Faith: New Testament," in 
The Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. Daniel Noel Freedman [New York: Doubleday, 1992] 
2.749-58, at 754). 
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Christ, gospel, and justification.3 Moreover the Pauline distinction has 
given rise to patristic, scholastic, and modern theologies of faith. Even 
if that warranted reflection on faith, still Avery Dulles's coverage of its 
theological history4 might ground a suspicion that little remains un-
thought and unsaid on the matter. And yet, however large the shadow 
cast by the Church's theological compendium, the law of incommensu-
rability keeps that heritage open to the future. Faith, after all, is first 
and last a divine gift exceeding the best understandings and most 
balanced doctrines yet formulated. Every aspect, therefore, lies open to 
continual discovery and new appreciation. 
More than that, changes in Church and culture commend, some-
times demand, that theology revisit faith no matter how assured or 
complete the doctrine. Catholicism since Vatican II has inaugurated 
those kinds of changes. Communion ecclesiology has deepened the 
Church's self-understanding and has initiated renewal of many struc-
tures (e.g. the episcopacy and parishes) in the ecclesial context of faith. 
A renewing Church in its turn has redefined church and culture rela-
tionships in, for example, Poland, Spain, Brazil, and the United States. 
Jose Casanova5 shows that conciliar influence reconfigured social mis-
sions. Conciliar renunciation of establishment has lifted the fulcrum of 
ecclesial influence in the temporal order out of the political and put it 
into the social sphere. This too makes a difference in the situation of 
faith that is worth examining. This article, however, heads in a differ-
ent direction. Following a path through the thought of John Courtney 
Murray (1904-1967), it proposes that Vatican II also has affected the 
interior act and habit of faith. 
When Murray addressed the subject of faith, he focused principally 
on its voluntary dynamic. The genre of the post-Tridentine analysis of 
faith led reflection in that direction. From his 1937 dissertation on the 
Cologne theologian Matthias J. Scheeben6 to the publication of The 
Problem of God,1 he worked within that genre's typical concentration 
on the genesis of faith. An apologetic orientation led the genre, the 
3
 Karl Rahner remarks that the three supernatural, infused virtues "are specified by 
being the basic modes of increasing acceptance of the divine self-communication by grace 
and of directing... spiritual, personal life towards the trinitarian God of eternal life by 
sharing in God's life itself" ("Virtue," in Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of The-
ology 6 (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970) 337-^7, at 338). 
4
 Avery Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For: A Theology of Christian Faith 
(New York: Oxford University, 1994). 
5
 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago, 1994). 
6
 John Courtney Murray, "Matthias Joseph Scheeben's Doctrine on Supernatural, 
Divine Faith: A Critical Exposition," in The Doctoral Dissertation of John Courtney 
Murray: Matthias Scheeben on Faith, ed. Thomas Hughson (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin 
Mellen, 1987). 
7
 John Courtney Murray, The Problem of God: Yesterday and Today (New Haven: Yale 
University, 1964); the book originated in the St. Thomas More Lectures at Yale in the 
winter of 1962. 
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predecessor to today's fundamental theology, to concern for clarity 
about crossing the threshold of faith. His postconciliar turn to the 
ecclesiological dimension of belief and unbelief was not disconnected 
from consideration of their voluntareity. Murray's publications on faith 
are relatively few,8 though rich; so there is no surprise in the fact that 
recent surveys of the topic in fundamental theology9 have left his work 
out of account.10 Although far from a complete theology of faith, his 
principle that faith has a voluntary dynamic since love for God causes 
assent to revelation is open to postconciliar reception. 
The first part of my article situates this reading of Murray against 
the background of some recent criticism about his standing as a para-
gon of Catholicism in the U.S. In the second part, I discuss the cen-
trality of the voluntary dynamic for Murray's approach to faith. The 
third and fourth parts illustrate specific ways he interpreted that dy-
namic. I then argue for bringing an implied historical consciousness of 
love to the surface so that, in the last section, I can propose a hypoth-
esis relating to the effect that Vatican II has had on the voluntareity of 
faith. 
8
 In addition to the works already mentioned, see "The Root of Faith: The Doctrine of 
M. J. Scheeben," TS 9 (1948) 20-46; The Problem of Religious Freedom, Woodstock 
Papers 7 (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1965), and an earlier, shorter form, "The Problem 
of Religious Freedom," TS 25 (1964) 503-75; "Freedom, Authority, Community," 
America 115 (December 3, 1966) 734-41; "The Status of the Nicene Creed as Dogma," 
Chicago Studies 5 (1966) 65-80; "The Danger of the Vows: An Encounter with Earth, 
Woman, and the Spirit," Woodstock Letters 116 (1967) 421-27; "Freedom in the Age of 
Renewal," American Benedictine Review 18 (1967) 319-24; "A Will to Community," in 
Theological Freedom and Social Responsibility, ed. S. F. Bayne (New York: Seabury, 
1967) 111-16. Other writings have theological components. For an account of Murray^ 
teaching duties in dogmatic theology at Woodstock College, see The Doctoral Disserta-
tion of John Courtney Murray, "Introduction" no. 5, 41. 
9
 Faith or an approach to it remains subject matter for fundamental theology despite 
variants in method. See David Tracy, Blessed Rage For Order (New York: Crossroad, 
1975) and The Analogical Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1981); Johann Baptist 
Metz, Faith in History and Theology: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology (New 
York: Crossroad, 1980); Gerald O'Collins and René Latourelle, ed., Problems and Per-
spectives of Fundamental Theology (New York: Paulist, 1980); Francis Schüssler 
Fiorenza, Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church (New York: Crossroad, 1984) 
and "Fundamental Theology," in New Dictionary of Theology, ed. Joseph Komonchak et 
al. (Wilmington, Del.: Glazier, 1989) 408-11; Avery Dulles, The Craft of Theology: From 
Symbol to System (New York: Crossroad, 1992). For an overview and argument for a 
specific subject matter, method, and identity, see René Latourelle, "Fundamental The-
ology: History and Specific Character," in The Dictionary of Fundamental Theology (New 
York: Crossroad, 1994) 324-32. 
10
 John OTtonnell, "Faith," in New Dictionary of Theology 375-86; Monika Hellwig, "A 
History of the Concept of Faith," in Handbook of Faith, ed. James Michael Lee (Bir-
mingham, Ala.: Religious Education, 1990) 3-23; Carroll Stuhlmueller, "The Biblical 
View of Faith: A Catholic Perspective," ibid. 99-122; Avery Dulles, "The Systematic 
Theology of Faith: A Catholic Perspective," ibid. 142-63; Avery Dulles, "Faith and Rev-
elation," in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives 1, ed. Francis Schüssler 
Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991) 89-128; Gilles Langevin, 
"Faith," in Dictionary of Fundamental Theology 309-15; Avery Dulles, The Assurance of 
Things Hoped For. 
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MURRAY AND HIS RECENT CRITICS 
Both his dissertation on Scheeben and The Problem of God figure in 
a recent article on the theological sources for Murray's ethics.11 J. Leon 
Hooper reads the texts as evidence that Murray formulated his ethical 
principles within the moral universe of Roman Catholicism, not on a 
natural-law basis outside time, faith, and community. Murray's ethics 
presupposed and implied the unified whole of the content of faith car-
ried by Catholic tradition. Hooper's approach indicates the primacy of 
faith as the horizon within which Murray argued philosophical, his-
torical, and jurisprudential as well as theological principles. Hooper's 
support of a strong rather than weak contribution from faith in his 
ethics encourages further inquiry into Murray's theological positions. 
Another interpretation of Murray, however, renders the inquiry futile. 
Some, whose criticisms echo opposition to Murray in the 1950s,12 seek 
to discredit his contribution and to nullify its influence.13 In their view 
his entire vision consisted in a theologically fatal compromise which 
tailored Catholic faith to the contours of an American status quo. Un-
derstandably disturbed by signs that Catholics have overadjusted to 
American culture,14 they pin the blame on Murray as the most guilty 
sponsor of American Catholicism's decline into a comfortable but spiri-
tually flaccid accommodation to modern, especially American, Uberai 
ideology.15 
11
 J. Leon Hooper, "Theological Sources of John Courtney Murray's Ethics," TS 57 
(1996) 19-45. 
12
 See Donald E. Pelotte, S.S.S., John Courtney Murray: Theologian in Conflict (New 
York: Paulist, 1975) on Murray's contretemps with the American Ecclesiastical Review. 
13
 Michael J. Schuck, "John Courtney Murray's Problematic Interpretations of Leo 
XIII and the American Founders," The Thomist 55 (1991) 592-612; William Gould, "The 
Challenge of Liberal Political Culture in the Thought of John Courtney Murray," Com-
munio 19 (1992) 113-44; David L. Schindler, "Religious Freedom, Truth, and American 
Liberalism: Another Look at John Courtney Murray," Communio 21 (1994) 696-741. 
14
 Robert Booth Fowler comments that both American Judaism and American Ca-
tholicism are en route to becoming "individualistic religions. People may be Catholic but 
they define that Catholicism now in their own terms," with the result that "Catholics and 
Jews are mostly Protestant... in this quintessential Uberai Protestant land" ("Religion 
and Liberal Culture," in Religion, Public Life and the American Polity, ed. Luis E. Lugo 
[Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1994] 201-21, at 209). Is this the case? See an 
intriguing argument for a distinctively "Catholic ethic" paralleling Max Weber's "Prot-
estant ethic" in John Tropman, The Catholic Ethic in American Society: An Exploration 
of Values, foreword by Rembert Weakland, O.S.B. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995). 
The Catholic ethic "is oriented toward sharing," whereas Weber considered the Protes-
tant ethic "oriented heavily to work, wealth, and achievement" (xiii). Robert Bellah et al. 
note that the Catholic tradition has "an emphasis on the common good [that] precludes 
the exclusion of anyone from society's care and concern" (Habits of the Heart: Individu-
alism and Commitment in American Life, updated ed. [Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia, 1996] x). 
15
 Of course, as Jean Bethke Elshtain observes, "there is no single, shared under-
standing of the self that grounds all forms of liberal theorizing"; instead, there are Kant's 
deontological liberalism, Bentham's utilitarianism, and the saturation of America in 
"ultra-liberalism" whose "vision of the self flows from seventeenth century contractarian 
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For Michael Schuck, this means Murray adopted a liberal model of 
the self in society. According to William Gould, Murray's political phi-
losophy imbibed too much liberal political culture. David L. Schindler 
argues that Murray grounded his argument for religious liberty in 
"nature's primitive 'indifference' toward God."16 According to Schin-
dler, Murray's sharp distinction between nature and grace views na-
ture, freedom, and the state as first of all in a condition of neutrality or 
indifference to God and religious truth. Schindler thinks that Murray's 
affirmation that government is incompetent (Murray did not say "in-
different")17 in matters of religion presupposes a concept of nature 
related to God through grace alone, as if it were not dependent because 
of creation. He supposes that Murray, on that basis, constructed a 
natural, autonomous freedom disconnected from the reality and knowl-
edge of God. Consequently, "for Murray, it is (logically) possible for the 
meaning of freedom to be engaged without implicating the question of 
God's truth."18 Either this interpretation of Murray's concept of nature 
and truth is correct or Murray adheres to Aquinas's natural-law prin-
ciples: that actually existing created natures depend on God for exis-
tence and operation as well as tend toward God; and that natural law 
is the rational creature's participation in God's eternal law. But Mur-
ray's Thomist natural-law theory is plain to see and has often been 
remarked on. So Schindler's reading is incorrect. It reads Murray out 
of the task of actualizing a postconciliar, American Catholic commu-
nion ecclesiology, when in fact his work could be among resources 
for it. 
The charge that Murray colluded with liberal ideology calls for some 
response. It is clear that Murray endorsed political institutions which 
he forthrightly attributed to a broad, liberal, Western Christian tradi-
tion of church-and-state dualism, of law as reasonable, and of the rule 
of law as the basic activity of the state. This liberal tradition engen-
dered the gradual realization, through suffering, that religious liberty 
belongs to human dignity. But did this plunge Murray into 19th- and 
discourse, a doctrine linked to the names of Hobbes and Locke (very different thinkers, 
to be sure)" ("Catholic Social Thought, the City, and Liberal America," in Catholicism 
and Liberalism: Contributions to American Public Philosophy, ed. David Hollenbach and 
Bruce Douglass [Cambridge; Cambridge University, 1994] 151-71, at 154). 
16
 Schindler, "Religious Freedom, Truth, and American Liberalism" 705. 
17
 See Murray's accomodationist position on the school-aid question and his opposition 
to Supreme Court reasoning in the Everson (1947) and McCollum (1948) cases (We Hold 
These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition [New York: Sheed & 
Ward, 1960] 143-54). He endorsed the statement from the Zorach case (1952) that 
government "respects the religious nature of the people and accommodates the public 
service to their spiritual needs" (ibid. 151). It was a signature theme of Murray's that the 
"first truth to which the American Proposition makes appeal . . . in that landmark of 
Western political theory, the Declaration of Independence . . . [is] the sovereignty of God 
over nations as well as over individual" people (ibid. 28). 
18
 Schindler, "Religious Freedom, Truth and American Liberalism" 734. 
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20th-century "doctrinaire liberalism"?19 Individualism is essential to 
liberalism of this sort. If individualism was missing from Murray's 
practice and theory, then his work cannot have been in collusion with 
liberal ideology. Did Murray somehow absorb modern American indi-
vidualism, then take it as a premise in his life and work? If so, this 
would have flawed Murray's theology of faith in basic principle, be-
cause adherence to a cultural tendency, erroneous at that, would have 
preempted faith as the supervening act, light, and content interpreting 
life in the culture. Murray would have made American culture the last 
word on faith, instead of considering faith as the norma non normanda 
for believers' theory and practice. But on the contrary, his Catholic 
practice and theory alike excluded liberal individualism.20 
The concept of practice (praxis) can be distinguished from technical 
implementation of preconceived theory (techne). In regard to Murray, a 
concept of practice can be broadened from Hooper's emphasis on Mur-
ray's learning from engaging in public discourse. It can include his 
free, public self-disposition in and through the explicitly religious 
structures of Catholic life as a vowed member of a religious congrega-
tion. This is to open the concept of practice to spirituality on the prin-
ciple that a lived relationship to God (practice) grounded Murray's 
theoretical writings (theory). This can be understood by analogy with 
the role that Ignatian spirituality (practice) played in the theology 
(theory) of Karl Rahner. Murray entered a Jesuit novitiate at the age 
of 16, took public vows at 18, and was ordained a priest in 1933. From 
16 until his death at 63 in 1967, he lived in a religious congregation. 
19
 Joseph Komonchak points to a "doctrinaire liberalism" that departed from what 
Murray considered a "broad liberal tradition" of the West, because it sought to exclude 
religion from public life. Komonchak helpfully points to a "distinction between liberal 
political structures, which the church can accept, and a Uberai ideology, which it must 
repudiate" ("Vatican II and the Encounter between Catholicism and Liberalism," in 
Catholicism and Liberalism 76-99, at 89). 
20
 On individualism and communitarianism in political theory see, e.g., Michael Wal-
zer, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," Political Theory 18 (February, 1990) 
6-23; Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 14 (1985) 308-22. See also Schuck, That They Be One: The Social Teaching of the 
Papal Encyclicals 1740-1989 (Washington: Georgetown University, 1991); David Hol-
lenbach, "The Common Good in the Postmodern Epoch: What Role for Theology?" in 
Religion, Ethics, and the Common Good, ed. James Donohue and M. Theresa Moser, 
R.S.C.J., The Annual Publication of the College Theology Society 41 (Mystic, Conn.: 
Twenty-Third, 1996) 3-22. Here, too, the essays in Catholicism and Liberalism and in 
Celebration and Challenge: One Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching, ed. John 
Coleman (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1991) are germane. 
21
 For the influence of Ignatian spirituality on Rahner's theology, see Harvey Egan, 
"Rahner's Mystical Theology," in Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rah-
ner, S.J., ed. William Kelly (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1980); Karl Rahner in 
Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews 1965-1982, ed. Paul Imhof et al. (New York: 
Crossroad, 1986); Leo O'Donovan, "Orthopraxis and Theological Method: Rahner," in 
Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings 35 (1980) 47-65; Paillette Skiba, 
"Karl Rahner's Transcendental Christology: A Resource for Catholic Social Teaching?" 
(unpublished dissertation, Marquette University, 1997). 
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His singular abilities and public prominence did nothing to diminish 
the reality of participation in a common life and mission. 
For example, he owned no private property. He earned no personal 
income, amassed no nest-egg for bequeathal to heirs, and received 
what resources he used from goods held in common. He took up pro-
fessional tasks of teaching, writing, editing, delivering public ad-
dresses, participating in the debates of American public life, not to 
mention liturgical and spiritual ministries, under a vow of obedience. 
He multiplied relationships of service and friendship on the basis of 
something other than a strategy for advancing self-interest. His labors 
contributed to and were part of the common good of the Catholic 
Church and of American society. His free self-disposition within a vow 
of obedience meant that his self-direction never ruled out readiness to 
heed the counsel and authority of superiors in his congregation or the 
Church.22 It could and did bring self-sacrifice, understood as a mode of 
fidelity to Christ. This was evident when he bore an official silencing in 
1954.23 Murray's obedience did not exemplify utilitarian or expressive 
individualism. Consequently, there is no plausible way to construe 
Murray's 47 years as a member of a religious congregation as an ex-
ercise in American individualism.24 
Rather, the inner form of his life-practice was imitatio Christi, an 
apostolic discipleship with a clear ecclesial dimension.25 His contribu-
tion to the pastoral mission of the Church through priestly ministry in 
retreats, liturgies, and preaching, not well-enough known,26 indicates 
a practical faith-understanding oriented to the breadth of the Church, 
not to individualistic preoccupation with his own salvation. So it would 
be massively inconsistent if his theory on religious liberty accepted or 
advocated individualism of any sort. Suspicion that ideology may cap-
ture theory if not practice raises the possibility that individualism 
gained entrance to his texts despite his manner of life. Did his writings 
on religious liberty in particular, like his practice, exclude a liberal 
model of the self? Murray's diachronic negation of "Continental Lib-
22
 Murray meditated on the risk essential to this kind of free self-disposition in "The 
Danger of the Vows: An Encounter with Earth, Woman and the Spirit,,, Woodstock 
Letters 116 (1967) 421-27; his portrayal of the feminine was not ahead of its time. 
23
 See Pelotte, John Courtney Murray. 
24
 Jean Bethke Elstain comments that "Atomism's absolutizing of choice and its cel-
ebration of radical autonomy all cast suspicion on ties of reciprocal obligation or mutual 
interdependence and help to erode the traditional bases of personal identity and author-
ity in families and civil society alike" ("Catholic Social Thought" 155). 
25
 On the ecclesial dimension in general, see Avery Dulles, "The Ecclesial Dimension 
of Faith," Communio 22 (1995) 418-32. 
26
 He was a sought-after preacher of retreats. The text of his sermon for the Red Mass 
in Washington, D.C., February 1953 (Murray Archives, file 2-294) witnesses to his homi-
letic interests. See bibliographical entries, 1953f and 1956i, in "Works by John Courtney 
Murray, S. J.," in J. Leon Hooper, Bridging the Sacred and the Secular: Selected Writings 
of John Courtney Murray, S.J. (Washington: Georgetown University, 1994) 343-55. 
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eralism" (1937)27 and "liberalist individualism" (I960)28 is evident and 
undeniable. The better-known 1960 position will be noted here. 
We Hold These Truths took issue with Locke on the origin of the state 
out of an allegedly original, asocial, apolitical condition of human ex-
istence.29 Murray objected that an inherently presocial self inhabiting 
a prepoliticai state of nature was a figment of philosophical imagina-
tion nowhere to be found in fact. He characterized this view of the 
person as follows: "In the state of nature, man appears with complete 
suddenness as a full-grown individual, a hard little atom in the midst 
of atoms equally hard, all solitary and self-enclosed, each a sociological 
monad."30 Locke's postulate of a "state of nature" of this sort, and his 
theory of the origin of the state in a contract aimed at protection of the 
life and private property of individualist contractées, Murray thought, 
corroded rather than sponsored or supported American democracy. So 
he pointed out the social aspect of the human rights protected but not 
invented by the Bill of Rights. America's founders, he argued, recog-
nized civil liberties as essential to the success of democratic self-
governance. The free-exercise clause in the First Amendment, for ex-
ample, brought social benefits and was essential to the common good of 
American society, not just to the private good of individuals. Free ex-
ercise of religion protected the freedom of religions to teach morality to 
their members who, because they could govern their own lives accord-
ing to conscience, were capable for tasks of national self-governance. In 
general, Murray always sought to "establish sociality as an initial de-
fining condition even for rights as immunities."31 
Accordingly, he rejected "liberalist individualism" as a foundation 
for the right to religious liberty. On the contrary, liberalism produced 
a theory of the person and of knowledge able to serve as a premise for 
the recrudescence of a monist state inimical to religious liberty. Mod-
ern monism, or totalitarianism, was the coercive claim by a state (e.g. 
the French Third Republic, the Soviet Union, the Third Reich) to su-
preme, undivided authority over all areas of social existence. Murray, 
with Pope Leo XIII, saw rationalist individualism as its theoretical and 
practical starting point. As rationalism it ruled out any truth or value 
not fully derived from human reason; as individualism it referred to 
the competence of an individual's rational capacity. In practice, it al-
27
 See, The Doctoral Dissertation of John Courtney Murray 22-26. 
28
 Murray, We Hold These Truths 309. 
29
 For the debate over Locke's influence on the founding of America, see Jerome 
Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence: Uni-
versity of Kansas, 1995); Murray approximated the view Huyler rejects, namely that 
"classical republicanism spoke of conceptions and concerns that were largely foreign to 
Locke's discourse, and vice versa" (ibid. ix). 
30
 We Hold These Truths 303. For an earlier proposal that the "age of individualism 
has ended," see The Construction of a Christian Culture" (1940), in Hooper, Bridging 
the Sacred and the Secular 101-23, at 111. 
31
 J. Leon Hooper, The Ethics of Discourse: The Social Philosophy of John Courtney 
Murray (Washington: Georgetown University, 1986) 154. 
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lowed the state to assume the role of reason writ large, coercive and 
intolerant of claims to truth and value beyond those presented by the 
state. 
He recalled that "it was against this type of liberalist individual-
ism—as positing a social and juridical monism and a concept of the 
absolute autonomy of the individual human reason—that the Catholic 
Church directed her uncompromising attacks during the nineteenth 
century, under appeal to the traditional natural law.' The claim that 
political authority had full, indivisible, and supreme authority in all of 
social existence represented a rejection of what Murray considered the 
core of a genuinely liberal tradition, that is, church-and-state dualism 
and natural law. Both Nazism and Communism were types of monism, 
and both predictably sought to control or extirpate the Church to pre-
vent the public presence of another authority teaching about self, so-
ciety, state, and justice. Both eliminated religious liberty. His Ameri-
can Catholic opposition to Nazism and Communism stemmed from a 
principled affirmation that the basic political institutions of America 
were in harmony with Catholic morality. This made his unreserved 
identification with the American cause in World War II and in the Cold 
War something other than an example of reducing Catholic faith to the 
American way of life (Schuck), to a liberal political culture (Gould), or 
to liberal ideology (Schindler). 
Moreover, We Hold These Truths opposed the hegemony of the En-
lightenment critique of tradition.33 He interpreted the emergence of 
Western legal and political protection for religious liberty as a conse-
quence primarily from tradition understood to include the institution-
alization, and not only the verbal transmission, of the gospel. And so 
the original subject of religious liberty was the whole, institutionally 
organized Church. Assertion and acquisition of its freedom for life and 
witness was the tree in whose shade people came to see and claim 
individual religious liberty. Murray disagreed with interpretations of 
the religious clauses as if they implemented preconceived theoretical 
concepts already deposited in documents, even the Bible. Instead he 
held that gradual, progressive formation of Western consciousness and 
political institutions by church-and-state dualism led the way. The 
path ran from the missions of Son and Spirit in the advent of the 
Church to Pope Gelasius's spelling out of church-and-state dualism; 
from there to medieval principles on the consent of the governed and 
the rule of law, through the Magna Carta in 1215 and English legal 
tradition, over to New World colonists' grass-roots appropriation of the 
rights of an Englishman, up through their resistance to state control of 
religion, into the founders' legal realism in a pluralist society, and 
32
 We Hold These Truths 309. 
33
 See, e.g., his defense of truth in the form of remembered wisdom when discussing 
America's "first prejudice" for non-establishment and religious liberty (ibid. 46-48). 
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arrived at resultant First Amendment religion clauses. Murray read 
the emergence of civil protection for religious liberty mostly as a prac-
tical lesson learned the hard way in a Western Christian history leav-
ened by church-and-state dualism. Even where Murray may err, as I 
think he did by slighting the contribution from free-church, especially 
Baptist, sources, he did not tend toward but away from liberal indi-
vidualism. 
We Hold These Truths argued an American Catholic alternative to, 
not version of, Hobbes, Locke. Rousseau, 19th-century rationalism and 
20th-century consumerism.3 The case for harmony between Catholi-
cism and American political institutions, particularly the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment, did not consist in subordinating 
Catholic principles to liberal individualism. He formulated a synthesis 
of Catholic with republican principles, ordered according to the church-
and-state norm that the spiritual (God, revelation, Christ, Church, 
grace, faith, conscience) is primary in dignity.35 The 1990s objection 
that Murray's writings contain liberal ideology to the detriment of 
faith is as invalid as was Francis J. Connell's 1950 charge that Mur-
ray's position on the First Amendment gave short shrift to the economy 
of salvation and the kingship of Christ. On the contrary, as Hooper 
indicated, Murray's thought on religious liberty too developed within 
the horizon of Catholic faith. There are, indeed, real problems and 
questions in regard to postconciliar appropriation of Murray. But his 
putative conforming of Catholic faith to a liberal ideology of the indi-
vidual is not one of them. How, then, did Murray understand the act of 
Catholic faith? 
THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE: LOVE MOVES ASSENT 
The theological impulse animating Murray's theology of faith was a 
response to Dei Filius, the Constitution on the Catholic Faith promul-
gated by Vatican I in 1870. The council had declared that "we are 
obliged to render by faith a full submission of intellect and will to God 
when he makes a revelation."36 This teaching could be read as if faith 
were an assent of mind for which a separate moral act of submission to 
34
 Individualism, observes Jean Bethke Elshtain, is "solidified by market images of the 
sovereign consumer" ("Catholic Social Thought" 155). 
35
 See Charles Taylor, "Religion in a Free Society," in Articles of Faith, Articles of 
Peace, ed. James Davison Hunter and Os Guinness (Washington: Brookings Institution, 
1990) on Protestant fusing of religious and republican convictions in 17th-century En-
gland and Holland. Taylor remarks, "In the case of the Puritan movements in the En-
glish Civil War, a Parliamentary case begins to be stated in part in terms of the old 
republican outlook. Milton was a Christian civic humanist" (101). Murray, it could be 
said, was an American Catholic civic humanist. 
36
 "Because man depends entirely on God as his creator and lord and because created 
reason is wholly subordinate to uncreated Truth, we are obliged to render by faith a full 
submission of intellect and will to God when he makes a revelation" {Dogmatic Consti-
tution on the Catholic Faith [Dei Filius], in The Decrees of Ecumenical Councils 2: Trent 
to Vatican II, ed. Norman P. Tanner [Washington: Georgetown University, 1990] 807). 
Vatican II incorporates part of the Vatican I statement: "The 'obedience of faith' (Rom. 
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God set the stage. Joseph Kleutgen's reading of Vatican I, for example, 
tended to identify faith with intellectual assent. In response, Matthias 
J. Scheeben (1835-1888),37 Pierre Rousselot (1878-1915),3* and then 
Murray seized upon an essential role played by love for God. Love for 
God was elicited by the grace of faith and moved assent to revelation. 
Murray concentrated on the voluntary dynamic in faith in order to 
counteract one-sidedly intellectualist interpretations of Vatican I that 
ignored or minimized a key theme from theological tradition. 
One popular analysis of the assent of faith ran as follows. First, once 
a person has taken account of signs, testimonies, arguments, etc., that 
make revelation credible, there is an assent to revelation precisely as 
divine truth, as the way things are.39 Holding these truths is human 
participation in divine wisdom and the knowledge of the blessed. The 
gospel is good news first of all because it is true news. Still, the gospel 
as a whole, but above all the strict mysteries of faith, exceed that which 
can be learned from created reality. How can a human being assent to 
the gospel as true if that assent does not conclude from prior truth in 
the way people conclude to all other judgments on truth? Can there be 
an assent to divine truth so different from all other judgments on what 
is real? Faith does not conclude to revealed truth from some other 
truth gained from created reality. Faith does not conclude, because it 
cannot. There is no prior truth a grasp of which enables someone to 
pass to faith as a conclusion. Then if not on the basis of a true premise 
or from its mediation by testimony open to corroboration, how can a 
person's act of judgment actually come to affirm that, 'Yes, I accept 
that as true"? 
16:26; cf. Rom. 1:5; 2 Cor. 10:5-6) must be given to God as he reveals himself. By faith 
man freely commits his entire self to God, making the full submission of his intellect and 
will to God who reveals . . . ' " (Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation [Dei Verbum] 
no. 4, in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents, gen. ed. Austin 
Flannery [Northport, N.Y.: Costello, 1988] 752). 
37
 For the texts of Scheeben that Murray considered, see the bibliography in The 
Doctoral Dissertation of John Courtney Murray 257-59. Available now but not when 
Murray wrote in 1937 are The Mysteries of Christianity, trans. Cyril Vollert (St. Louis: 
B. Herder, 1946); Nature and Grace, trans. Cyril Vollert (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1954); 
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Josef Höfer, Martin Grabmann et al., 8 vols. (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1949-67). Scholarship on Scheeben likewise has increased; see among others: 
Eugen Paul, "Matthias Joseph Scheeben (1835-1888)," with bibliography, in Katholische 
Theologen Deutschlands im 19. Jahrhundert 2, ed. Heinrich Fries and Georg Schwaiger 
(Munich: Kösel, 1975); Wegbereiter heutiger Theologie; Matthias Scheeben (Cologne: Sty-
ria, 1976); Karl-Heinz Minz, Pleroma Trinitatis: Die Trinitätstheologie bei Matthias 
Joseph Scheeben (Frankfurt: Lang, 1982). 
38
 In the dissertation Murray referred only in passing to Les yeux de la foi by Pierre 
Rousselot, S.J.; see the volume containing the two works of Rousselot, The Eyes of Faith, 
trans. Joseph Donceel, and his Answer to Two Attacks, trans. Avery Dulles (New York: 
Fordham University, 1990). Focus on the role of the will in faith was also paramount for 
Rousselot; see John M. McDermott, Love and Understanding: The Relation of Will and 
Intellect in Pierre Rousselot's Christological Vision (Rome: Gregorian University, 1983). 
39
 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 31: Faith (2a2ae, 1-7), Latin text and 
English translation, éd. T. C. O'Brien (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1974). 
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The answer from Augustine to Aquinas had been that the act of faith 
springs from a love for God that is the first effect of the grace of faith. 
Augustine said, "It is love that asks; it is love that seeks; it is love that 
makes one adhere to revelation; and it is love that maintains the ad-
herence once it is given/'40 Consequently, the faith that justifies "is a 
loving submission to Christ the Lord {credere Christo) and a movement 
of the soul that seeks union with Christ {credere in Christum)"*1 This 
characterization appealed to the Fourth Gospel's description of believ-
ers being drawn by the Father (6:44,65; 8:32).42 Later, the Council of 
Orange declared that the initium fidei was a "trustful adherence" {cre-
dulitatis affectus) "by which we first enter into communion with God" 
(Canon).43 The trusting love, said Augustine and Orange, is "not a 
product of our natural powers but is a gift of the Holy Spirit at work in 
our hearts."44 Aquinas followed suit when he too affirmed a graced love 
interior to faith. This is not to say that he conducted an analysis simply 
on the authority of Augustine but to identify his consistency with Au-
gustine. 
Aquinas, however, often referred to the role of the will in terms of a 
"command of [by] the will." In response to the question whether it is 
meritorious to believe, he wrote that "to believe is an act of mind 
assenting to the divine truth by virtue of the command of the will as 
this is moved by God through grace."45 And so, reasoned Aquinas, faith 
is a free and therefore meritorious act. Elsewhere he conceived the act 
of will in faith as an "affection" which "determines" the intellect stat-
ing, for example, that "the beginning of faith is in affection insofar as 
the will determines the intellect to assent to the things of faith."46 This 
willing, he clarified, "is not an act of charity nor of hope but is a certain 
appetite for the good promised."47 Mohler explained this to mean, "the 
will is drawn on by the supernatural good, which is God . . . in the 
beatific vision,"48 and so drawn, inclines the mind to assent to things 
it cannot see because God guarantees their truth. Murray followed 
40
 Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae 1.17.31, quoted in Dulles, Assurance 26. 
41
 Dulles, ibid. 26. 
42
 See The Doctoral Dissertation of John Courtney Murray 236. Gilles Langevin re-
marks that "in the Gospel of John, faith is born of the attraction exerted by the Father, 
who invites human beings to share in the life of the Trinity"; he sums up Pauline 
teaching on faith by saying that for Paul and Luke "faith proceeds from the eschatologi-
cal action of God in the raising of Jesus and in the preaching making him known" 
("Faith" 309). 
43
 Dulles, Assurance 28. ** Ibid. 
45
 Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 2, a. 9, resp.; trans. T. C. O'Brien 97. 
46
 De veritate q. 14, a. 2, ad 10; trans. James A. Mohler, The Beginning of Eternal Life: 
The Dynamic Faith of Thomas Aquinas, Origins and Interpretation (New York: Philo-
sophical Library, 1968) 147, no. 23. 
47
 Ibid. 147. « Ibid. 64. 
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Aquinas, though he supported a renewal in patristics,49 and described 
the voluntareity of assent to the Word of God in terms other than 
Aquinas's "command of the will."50 Emphasis on a voluntary dynamic 
immanent in the intellectual assent of faith characterized Murray's 
theology of faith. It was a position that he began to develop as a modi-
fication of Scheeben's. 
INTERPRETATION: LOVE EXPRESSES FINALITY 
In his "Matthias Joseph Scheeben's Doctrine on Supernatural, Di-
vine Faith: A Critical Exposition" (1937), Murray stressed that 
Aquinas had pointed to the voluntary dynamic in faith. Murray inter-
preted this to mean that love was an option for, a self-dedication to, 
God as supreme good and last end. This option moved assent. His 
concept incorporated Aquinas's principle of final causality: faith fulfills 
a human tendency toward God {reditus) and not only a reverence due 
to God as first efficient cause from which all created being has come 
forth {exitus). Murray caught sight of Aquinas's situating of faith 
within the exitus I reditus plan. Faith was the beginning of the salvific 
return of rational creatures to God by way of union with Christ. His 
focus on finality opened up a point of departure from Scheeben's the-
ology of faith. 
In his Dogmatik (1873) Scheeben had expounded a theology of faith 
in the service of Vatican I's teaching. The act of belief was for him the 
supreme instance of creaturely obedience to the Creator, whose au-
thority commands that creatures accept divine revelation as true. 
Faith fulfilled the fundamental moral duty rational creatures owed to 
the Creator. Earlier, in Nature and Grace (1861), Scheeben had con-
ceived faith along the lines of the Greek Fathers. Murray noted Schee-
ben's indebtedness to Maximus the Confessor.51 According to this pre-
Vatican I approach, faith participated in the Son's knowledge of the 
Father. Faith was an anticipatory mode of beatific vision that divinized 
the created understanding. When Vatican I reemphasized the prin-
ciple of divine and apostolic authority in the Church and underlined 
faith as obedience, Scheeben refocused his views. In his post-Vatican I 
theology, faith did not so much participate in the Son's knowledge of 
the Father as it shared in the Son's self-sacrifice to the Father. Rev-
49
 For indications, see Murray, "Patristic Study," TS 9 (1948) 250-51; "The Christian 
Idea of Education," an address at St. Louis University, November, 1955, in Hooper, 
Bridging 133^±1; and The Problem of God. 
50
 J. H. Newman likewise saw how central a graced, voluntary dynamic was to the 
assent of faith. He identified the pia affectio as a devout state of mind disposing a person 
to welcome the truth of Christ. Because of a spirit of reverence for God a "divinely 
enlightened mind sees in Christ the very Object whom it desires to love and worship— 
the Object correlative to its own affections" (Newman's University Sermons: Fifteen 
Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford, 1826-1843 [London: SPCK, 1970] 236; 
quoted in Dulles, Assurance 85). 
51
 See The Doctoral Dissertation of John Courtney Murray 89 n. 19. 
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erent submission to divine authority in an act of faith was a believer's 
sacrificium intellectus in imitation of Christ's obedience. 
Scheeben's Dogmatik stressed this partly in opposition to a rival 
claim. Some learned people claimed to have arrived at a natural faith 
from rationally evident premises and evidences. This did not involve 
obedience to the Creator, repentance for sin, or resolution to live in an 
amended way. Their type of consent to God, Scheeben warned, con-
tained neither reverent submission nor personal commitment to God. 
Natural faith did not animate a new way of life and was not to be 
considered equivalent to the supernatural, divine faith professed by 
the Catholic Church. Affirmation of revealed truth that did not at the 
same time involve a change in way of life was not the faith of the 
Gospels. Scheeben countered that, on the contrary, believing with di-
vine, supernatural faith was the devout fulfillment of a universal 
moral duty toward the Creator that was incumbent on all rational 
creatures. This obligation pertained to the order of truth no less than 
to the order of the moral good. Had not Vatican I taught that created 
reason is absolutely subject to uncreated Truth? In agreement, Schee-
ben argued that created reason fulfilled the duty toward uncreated 
Truth in the obedience of faith. This involved, however, a personal 
surrender to God in accepting divine revelation as true. Love and com-
mitment characterized the act of belief. It was not an intellectual act 
disconnected from reverence for God and conversion of life. 
On the contrary, Scheeben taught, faith synthesized intellectual and 
volitional acts, integrated mind and heart. Faith fused obedient love 
for God with assent to God's revelation as true. This went beyond 
merely underscoring Vatican Fs correlation of divine command (rev-
elation) and creaturely obedience (faith). Scheeben's originality on the 
point lay in conceiving the command-obedience structure by analogy 
with parent-child relations. The created reality he used as an analogue 
to revelation and faith was benevolent paternalism and childlike obe-
dience in family life. The affective dynamic in an act of faith was like 
the trusting reverence a cherished child had for a beloved parent. The 
affective dimension of faith was a childlike, trusting reverence for God 
the Creator {pius credulitatis affectus). 
In commanding that revelation be accepted as true on divine author-
ity, God was like a revered parent whose authoritative commands were 
beneficent and could be so appreciated by the child, though reasons for 
them might escape the child's understanding. Like a parent directing 
a child, the Creator placed a demand on all rational creatures crucial 
to the hearers' good. Faith was like the child's act of receiving the 
parental injunction as true and worthy of adherence, even if the child 
could not grasp the reasons for the parental mandate beyond knowing 
it was good to perform what had been enjoined. With this analogy 
Scheeben argued that saving faith was far from a rationalist natural 
faith void of love, dedication, and reverence. It was not the detached, 
purely cerebral assent which Kleutgen and others had propounded as 
the authentic meaning of Vatican I. 
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Murray endorsed Scheeben's attention to an affective dynamic in 
faith. But he dropped Scheeben's child-parent analogy. Instead of un-
derstanding pia affectio as childlike trust, Murray had recourse to 
Aquinas's idea of creaturely finality to the Creator. The pia affectio was 
reverent acceptance of the finite, creaturely condition and concomitant 
dedication to the Creator. Creaturehood involved finality toward full 
actualization in the supreme good and last end. Voluntary adherence 
to God in faith fulfilled and elevated a natural desire for God. The 
divine act of revealing did something other than let fall onto creatures 
an external, divine demand for a new kind of obedience. 
The gift of faith evoked and enabled a creaturely embrace and trans-
formation of the believer's inherent finality to fulfillment in God, a 
tendency misdirected by sin and surpassed by grace. Divine grace in-
clined the heart and enlightened the mind to accept God's Word. The 
gift initiated conversion, fulfillment, and elevation of the finality in 
rational human nature toward its Creator, now known as last end. 
Faith actualized a personally possessed created nature. Faith was not 
heteronomous submission to One who is simply omnipotent Other. For 
Murray, faith was entry into a new, definitive and personal relation-
ship with the Creator. Faith was a believer's self-surrender engaged in 
the form of a divinely enabled self-realization of a created human na-
ture. This was a respectful step beyond Scheeben's interpretation of 
faith as a childlike sacrificium intellectus in obedience to an external 
divine command. 
For Murray, faith was creaturely obedience. But this obedience 
heeded the first mode of the Creator's command to rational creatures. 
The command existed in the mode of created human nature's own 
finality toward God. The act of faith obeyed this internal structure of 
human existence no less than it heeded divine authority mediated 
through biblical teaching and church preaching. Belief accepted the 
personally possessed finality of human nature. Consequently, faith 
had an aspect of fidelity and obedience to the believer's own created 
existence. This made faith an act sui generis rather than a fulfillment 
of a generic moral duty. The enactment of full creaturely dependence 
on the Creator also consummated the human self-understanding and 
self-disposition of the believer as creature. Where Scheeben conceived 
the consecratory aspect of faith in terms of a child's dedication to car-
rying out a parental command, Murray saw the consecration of self in 
light of human finality toward God. Faith was, it can be said on the 
basis of Murray's text, an adult option to consecrate one's life to God. 
Murray's vision of faith placed the believer in teleological relation to 
God as last end.52 This means that God is the goal within all goals, the 
absolute fulfillment transcending the completion of any act. The ab-
sence of that fulfillment is the signature of the mortal pilgrimage of 
52
 The source for this principle is Aquinas; but it is worth noting that it also accords 
with the "First Principle and Foundation" in Ignatius Loyola's Spiritual Exercises which 
Murray knew well. 
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faith. God as last end is the fiillness in which and toward which all 
activities tend. This affirms, though Murray did not develop the point, 
a tendency toward God prior to faith. This implies that the graced act 
of love internal to faith is also a conversion of the prior finality. And the 
emergence of the new love is renewal and elevation of a prior, perhaps 
inchoate and surely somewhat misguided orientation to God. Crea-
turely love for God the first cause becomes love for God as last end and 
source of eternal beatitude. 
In addition, Murray's earliest theology of faith was in principle, 
though not in amount of content, christocentric. Jesus revealed divine 
authority in a ministry of visible self-giving. Jesus invited hearers to 
faith but did not simply relay a divine command to believe backed up 
by powerful signs. The authority with which Jesus acted and taught 
did not expect or solicit a parent-child relationship with followers. 
Though Murray did not make the point, it could also be said that faith 
had a structure leading to friendship. Thus, Murray departed from 
Scheeben's benevolent paternalism by interpreting the obediential as-
pect of faith as a co-affirmation of the humanity of the believer. The 
voluntary dynamic of faith was also its obediential dynamic. 
INTERPRETATION: LOVE DEFINES THE BELIEVER 
In 1948, for a slightly revised third chapter of his 1937 dissertation, 
'The Root of Faith: The Doctrine of M. J. Scheeben," Murray eluci-
dated one particular aspect of faith's voluntary dynamic. The affective 
dynamic became the "root of faith." His metaphor invoked a principle 
that was not only an initium fidei conceivable by analogy with efficient 
causality but also a continuous, immanent influence more like formal 
causality. Love for God did not just jump-start an act of faith but was 
an ongoing source for the habit of faith. The Problem of God in 1964 
once again made the voluntary dynamic of faith a major theme, this 
time within a scriptural context. Murray conceived the universal hu-
man experience of the problem of God as the substance of the biblical 
history of Israel. 
Though he brought the history forward through the New Testament 
and into patristic recourse to Greek philosophy, Murray located the 
problem of God first and foremost in the lived experience of Israel, not 
primarily in the metaphysical inquiries of Plato and Aristotle. Much 
less did the problem emerge from the postmedieval, Western transition 
into modern science and philosophy. The solution to the problem did 
not consist in a theistic theorem argued precisely as theory, but in an 
act of free, self-surrendering, and self-defining belief in God-with-us-
in-Christ. Once again Murray attended to the source of faith in a pre-
theoretical love for God. What in 1937 and 1948 had been a theme 
raised in relief against the background of Vatican I had become the 
golden thread through biblical narratives of faith. 
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In the Bible the leading alternative to faith was not reason but 
ignorance. The Hebrew Scriptures opposed "knowledge of God" to "ig-
norance of God." This kind of "knowledge" involved a knower's free-
dom, love, and self-disposition. Such knowing was the full, self-
defining act by the whole person. Murray contrasted this with the 
usual view by noting that "knowledge of God" was "an affair of the 
heart, in the biblical sense of the heart as the center and source of the 
whole inner life in its full complex of thought, desire, and moral deci-
sion."53 The act of faith originated, then, in the human É<heart" whose 
primal deliberations embraced a "full complex of thought, desire and 
moral decision." From the heart sprang a life of belief in God which is 
"knowledge of God" or the refusal known as "ignorance of God." Knowl-
edge or ignorance of God were the two alternatives. Each is formed 
first of all and characteristically in free, primal, practical self-
definition, an existential stance. Only then could either become subject 
matter for theoretical understanding. Despite all the singularities ex-
hibited in Israel's coping with the "problem of God," Murray held that 
"the Old Testament problematic endures as the permanent religious 
problematic of all mankind."54 Israel's particularity disclosed some-
thing universally human. Israel's struggle revealed, for example, that 
the root of faith in God lies in free, practically intelligent self-
dedication to God. This moves judgment to accept God's Word as true. 
His basic principle was that "knowledge of God is not an affair of 
affirmation [intellectual judgment] alone; it is a free engagement in a 
whole style of life."55 This was his position on the voluntary dynamic in 
faith on the eve of Vatican II. 
In analyzing various types of atheism Murray showed that volunta-
reity was not voluntarism. First, atheism had a voluntary dynamic and 
an intelligible content. Just as knowledge of God was "free engagement 
in a whole style of life," so too was its opposite. That is, "ignorance of 
God is not simply a want of knowledge or even a denial; it too is the free 
choice of a mode of being."56 He recalled that "the Bible clearly locates 
the ultimate root of atheism not in an erroneous judgment of the mind 
but in an act of choice, made somehow in the name of freedom."57 The 
choice was for a godless life. This made the choice an act of self-
definition. Self-definition involved a somewhat knowable way of life, at 
least as an inner orientation. The choice was practical and existential 
but not a contentless option for self-expression. Adhering to a theory of 
reality was, for Murray, a secondary act dependent on the primary act 
and content of self-definition. 
Second, Murray saw that defining the broadest contours of one's life 
had to do with recognizing oneself or not. In fact, love for God ex-
pressed as formal belief in God was the fundamental human act of 
Murray, The Problem of God 21. 54 Ibid. 25. 
Ibid. 77. 56 Ibid. 
Ibid. 84. 
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self-recognition and self-understanding. Likewise, atheism was a mat-
ter of human self-understanding and identity. Unbelief no less than 
belief involved at its most basic level who one understood oneself to be, 
as well as whether one thought there were or were not sufficient 
grounds forjudging one way or the other on the question whether God 
exists. Murray explained that "the will to atheism, again like the will 
to faith, issues forth from the deepest regions of the self, where free-
dom is more than choice [specific choices], where it is the self recog-
nizing its own existence in the recognition of God or rejecting its own 
existence in the refusal of God."58 In the drama of human existence, 
inside or outside Christianity, the voluntary "root" of belief or unbelief 
was an act of basic self-definition, personal, and possibly also commu-
nal. In the case of faith, love for God as last end was expressed in free 
self-disposition. But it was love for God immanent in affirmation of 
something true about self and God. 
Because of the priority of this act of free self-definition, whether 
complete and whole in belief or truncated in unbelief, Murray con-
cluded that "atheism is never the conclusion of any theory, philosoph-
ical or scientific." Instead, "it is a decision, a free act of choice that 
antedates all theories."59 This fundamental act of choice inspired athe-
istic philosophies rather than flowing from them as a conclusion. That 
interpretation was, he thought, "derivative from the Bible."60 The act 
of choice was pretheoretical, but not apart from known content. 
What was the content of the fundamental act of self-definition? The 
content was not primarily that of specific choices. Belief or unbelief 
was prior to and immanent in specific choices about particular objects. 
The priority was one of interiority, not of temporal sequence and more 
like a relation of cause to effect. But if prior to specific choices such as, 
for example, how to earn a livelihood, whom to marry, whether to seek 
further education, then what was the content of self-definition? As 
Murray pointed out by referring to an "engagement in a whole style of 
life," the definition outlined the journey of one's life. Self-definition as 
belief affirmed and accepted both one's own self as creature and the 
divine source as last end. For Murray belief in God affirmed the teleo-
logical structure of human existence. 
Murray, it is true, did not cast his position in the vocabulary of 
"correlation" or "dialogue." Yet in 1962 he treated free, practical affir-
mation that "I am" and "God is" precisely as the believer's affirmative 
correlation of teleologically structured human existence and divine re-
ality. Conversely, an option for unbelief rejected a teleological inter-
pretation of human existence. Assent to God in faith involved recog-
nizing and accepting the godward structure of human existence. Ac-
58
 Ibid. 85. 59 Ibid. 95. 
60
 Murray points to a pretheoretical self-disposition prior to argument that therefore 
could be considered a moment in a personal and social narrative. 
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ceptance contained self-recognition. This self-recognition was carried 
along within the love for God moving assent to the Word of God. The 
root of faith was love for divine reality as source and last end of the one 
believing. The graced love for God moving faith was, therefore, an 
interpretation of the apprehended whole of reality concentrated in a 
recognition of oneself as open toward the divine. 
IMPLICATION: HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF LOVE 
The analysis of atheism in Chapter 3 of The Problem of God can be 
read as implying something else about the voluntareity of faith. Re-
ceiving the grace of faith necessarily occurs in a contingent, historical 
mode with a cultural aspect. The familiar principle that divine reality 
is received ad modum recipientis is true for receiving the grace of faith. 
And part of that mode is historical and cultural particularity. The 
voluntareity of belief, like that of unbelief, has a historically specific, 
culturally determined element. Murray did not parallel his discussion 
of various modes of atheism with exploration of the specific modes of 
voluntareity in faith. Instead he treated the 'Variant modalities of the 
will to atheism that lie at the root of the variant historical forms of 
atheism."61 In Chapter 3, more than in his exposition in earlier chap-
ters of how a quadriform structure in the problem of God emerged, 
Murray unearthed a contingent element in the voluntareity of unbe-
lief. This was his historical consciousness of the origin of unbelief, and, 
I proposed, of belief as well. 
In The Problem of Religious Freedom*2 written in 1964 during Vat-
ican II, Murray applied Bernard Lonergan's distinction between clas-
sicist and historical consciousness of truth to Catholic doctrine on re-
ligious liberty, and church-and-state relations. The council was moving 
toward affirmation of religious liberty and away from establishment as 
an exigency of faith. Did this imply departing from Leo XIII's denun-
ciations of religious liberty? Murray argued for a continuity through 
development, a position that helped clear the way for approval of the 
council's Declaration on Religious Liberty,^ as is well-known. What 
has not been noticed is that in 1964 the Problem of God also had 
transposed the question of belief and unbelief from a classicist to a 
historically conscious mode of understanding. Murray placed the free, 
practical act of self-definition, the root of faith or unbelief, within the 
scope of historical consciousness. 
Accordingly, he did not treat atheism as if it were monolithic and 
identically instantiated everywhere and at all times. He noticed a va-
riety of species within the genus of modern atheism. A voluntary dy-
61
 Murray, The Problem of God 85. 
62
 Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom; reproduced in J. Leon Hooper, ed., 
Religious Liberty: Catholic Struggles with Pluralism (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/Knox, 
1993) 127-97. 
63
 Dignitatis humanae; see Flannery translation, Vatican Council II 799-812. 
 at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 16, 2016tsj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND POSTCONCILIAR FAITH 499 
namic was common to all. Every type took its rise in a pretheoretical, 
practical act of will. What differentiated the various types belonged to 
that act rather than to cinturai conditions only as external circum-
stances. There was an internal circumstance. This left a gap in the 
statement of Murray's theory. How was it possible for a free act to 
counteract the teleogical structure of human existence? The following 
principle fills the gap. The will to atheism actualized a universal will-
to-exist in a particular, contingent mode marked by an absence, for 
some reason, of an adequate idea of the personal source and last end of 
human existence. If so, atheism too was a self-appropriation of the 
teleological structure of human existence and perhaps of human dig-
nity, but involved a defective theoretical mediation of them. Atheism 
had always, however, a voluntary dynamic with a contingent cultural 
element. Denial of God was always denial of God understood in such 
and such a way. 
This was the formal model for the structure of the voluntary dy-
namic in faith as well. Self-appropriation of the will-to-exist in this 
case correlated with an adequate idea of God who could then be af-
firmed as source and last end. Consequently, Murray's identification of 
variations in the voluntary dynamic of atheism permits an inference to 
variations in the voluntary dynamic in faith. And to the source of those 
variations in a contingent, concrete, culturally specific element. As was 
the case with atheism, this element pertains to the person's society, 
culture, and position in history; this element varies as do societies, 
cultures, and eras. The voluntary dynamic in faith always has both a 
universal and a particular aspect. The universal is the will-to-exist. 
The particular is a specification of this according to concrete goods 
loved and love for God surpassing and transforming the culturally 
qualified loves. Variety in cultures means variety in the voluntary 
dynamic of faith. Change in a culture means change in the contingent 
element, the cultural specification, in that dynamic. Should a society or 
culture undergo significant change, this would exert pressure within 
the act of faith on the previous contingent element, possibly inducing 
change in it. This means that the act of faith, even by believers holding 
the same body of truths and dwelling in a common culture, can evolve. 
For example, by the end of The Problem of God historical conscious-
ness of faith compels a new form of the ancient question about God's 
existence. Instead of "Does God exist or not?" and the biblical cri du 
coeur "Is God with us or not?" Murray asks, "Is the presence of God 
constitutive of man's historical existence or destructive of it?"64 He 
presupposed resolution of the theoretical question about God's exis-
tence into the practical, biblical search for God's presence. But then he 
reconceived divine presence. Biblical models of divine presence in 
theophanies or even in Emmanuel, "God-with-us," applied to Christ 
gave to the search a positive assurance that God was faithful to us 
Murray, The Problem of God 120. 
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amid our trials and sufferings. However, this did not yet say much 
about human action toward social and political goals. That issue 
needed to be raised within the human-divine relationship. And so Mur-
ray recast the problem of God as a search for divine presence, as an 
efficacious being-with-us that enables human beings to stand forth in 
their freedom, to direct their actions and assume their role as shapers 
of society. So the question with which he closed The Problem of God 
was: Do God and faith enable people to assume socially constructive 
and nation-building tasks? If the answer is "yes," God and faith em-
power people to mobilize their human resources toward the common 
good in the temporal order. If the answer is "no," God and faith cripple 
this capacity. Which is it? 
Arguing that God and faith were socially and politically constructive 
would provide a new form of biblical "knowledge of God" as "constitu-
tive of man's historical existence." A negative answer was a new form 
of biblical "ignorance of God" alleging that divine presence destroys 
human historical agency. Each alternative was testable by recourse to 
history for evidence of individual and social action. Which alternative 
has enabled, which has destroyed, the ability of a person or a society to 
constitute their "historical existence"? Has acknowledging the pres-
ence of God produced the result that "a man may exist, 'stand forth' as 
a man in freedom and in human action"? Has "knowledge of God" or 
"ignorance of God" promoted a way of life and action "that alienates 
man from himself? Has so destructive an effect come from "confession 
of God's presence in history and in man's consciousness"? Or from "the 
suppression of [God] from history and the repression of [God] from 
consciousness"? 
Murray's implied answer is obvious from his critique of bourgeois 
atheism, Marxist communism, and Sartrean existentialism. Of course 
"knowledge of God" enabled a person or society to "stand forth in free-
dom and in human action." But raising the question does more than 
merely elicit that answer. The question surfaces a new contingency in 
the voluntary dynamic of faith. The contingent element has become the 
modern, Western appreciation of active responsibility for society and 
nation, a culturally inflected love for the common temporal good and 
the tasks proper to its achievement. Murray's question builds a deter-
minate modality into faith or, contrarily, into atheism. His question 
was about modern faith, its answer pointed to a voluntary dynamic 
qualified by modernity's recognition of people's active participation in 
society and state. The love for God that moves faith is love by one who 
participates in the mores, goals, and values characteristic of a given 
cultural milieu and historical epoch. Only a love for God as last end 
who empowers people socially and politically converts, not annihilates, 
appreciation for the active contribution of every person toward the 
common temporal good. 
The grace of faith affects finality toward God ad modum recipientis. 
This includes mediation of the finality by other goods people also love. 
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Love for the Creator of culturally accessible goods undergoes transfor-
mation into love for God as last end and beatitude. The Creator can 
only be known and loved through a surpassing of cultural values and 
concrete goods. Such evaluations are culturally variable and histori-
cally mutable. This shifts the problem of God out of a classicist concept 
of objective truth and value into historical consciousness of the per-
sonal and social subjects who know and love. This means, and it is a 
discovery based on Murray's theology of faith, that the voluntary dy-
namic of faith, no less than any formulation of truth, is from the start 
codetermined by social and cultural particularities.65 The "root of 
faith" which is love for God has a contingent aspect drawing on and 
transforming the created goods appreciated by the believer's culture in 
a given era. 
A conclusion from Murray is that the graced pia affectio referred to 
by theological tradition realizes itself always in a particular cultural 
mode which gives faith a historically variable concreteness. Cultural 
modes speak languages resonant with memories of goods loved and 
truths known. A culturally inflected love for God ascends from a soci-
ety's appreciations for concrete goods. When moving the mind to assent 
to revelation, affection for the Creator is as new as the grace of faith 
and the arrival of the saving Word. But the newness also renews and 
transforms, heals and elevates already existent love for goods and 
truths available to a person in the culture. The will-to-faith is always 
a culturally inflected love for God that transforms but cannot bypass 
loves for whatever created goods the culture prizes. 
For example, in his Confessions and in the light of faith, Augustine 
remembered prior loves and preceding judgments of truth. He re-
counted ascending through the truth and value of Cicero's Hortensius 
while also discerning its error and vice. So with the doctrine of the 
Manichees and Platonic teachings before he arrived at the definitive 
truth and value present in Christ, Bible, and Church. His act of faith 
and his theology bear the imprint of a long journey through his cul-
turéis). Augustine's love for God as Creator interior to the act of belief 
had a contingent element that was specific to his historical heritage 
and cultural milieu. Similarly specific and contingent elements 
marked the love moving the faith of Martin Luther, Ignatius of Loyola, 
Teresa of Avila, Thérèse of Lisieux, Pope Leo XIII, and Pope John 
XXIII. The act of faith (not only its scriptural, liturgical, and doctrinal 
content) in fourth-century Milan, 16th-century Wittenberg, Avila, or 
Manresa differs from the ground up from an act of faith by an inhab-
itant of 19th-century Europe or of present-day Latin America, India, 
Poland, the Philippines, or Ireland. What Murray called the "root of 
faith," the voluntary dynamic whereby love for God moves assent to 
65
 That all knowing involves mutual codetermination by universal and particular is a 
main theme in the hermeneutical philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer; see, e.g., his 
Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1982). 
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revelation, has a contingent element as variable as cultures are di-
verse. 
So from 1937 to 1964 Murray held that, as Langevin states, "faith 
implies a deliberate acceptance of the creaturely condition" because 
faith "supposes a surrender to the creative power of God, or a rejection 
of self-sufficiency."66 But Langevin focuses on "acceptance of the crea-
turely condition" as a bracing, salutary shock of confrontation with 
human limits. The limited human person, tempted to confuse openness 
to being with being infinite, comes-to-self by dismantling protection 
from the truth of finitude. And yet Murray understood voluntary ac-
ceptance of the creaturely condition more positively. Loving obedience 
to the Creator did more than, as a last gasp, admit finitude and ac-
knowledge divine reality. It was acknowledging one's being-unto-God 
and consecrating oneself to God as the last end who is most loved. For 
Murray, creaturely dependence involved finality toward God and a 
variable, contingent element in love for the Creator that the grace of 
faith evoked. 
At this point the axis of reflection shifts. The reading of Murray so 
far has pertained to his understanding of the genesis of faith or athe-
ism. This was the main subject matter for his analysis fidei from 1937 
through 1964. The hypothesis based on that turns more to habitual 
faith, the ordinary life of faith after its beginning. Murray's implied 
principle that the contingency of history and culture marks, though it 
does not entirely constitute, love for the Creator will be extended into 
consideration of the life of Catholic faith renewed by the influence of 
Vatican II. This is not to the claim that I am summing up his post-
conciliar thought, nor that this is the only way to conceive postconciliar 
reception of his theology of faith. 
A HYPOTHESIS: VATICAN II ALTERS HABITUAL FAITH 
My fundamental-theological hypothesis is that Vatican II affects the 
voluntareity of habitual faith. The cumulative impact of the event, 
documents, and charism of the council shifts attention from the free-
dom of faith to the dignity of the believer as imago Dei.67 This was not 
something Murray proposed. Rather, drawing upon the council's Pas-
toral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,68 his postcon-
66
 Langevin, Dictionary of Fundamental Theology 310. 
67
 Hermann J. Pottmeyer seems to have stated the case well: "The task that must be 
faced at the end of the second phase of the post-conciliar history of reception is to 
incorporate what is still binding in pre-conciliar theology into the newly acquired foun-
dation, that is, into a communio ecclesiology and a Christian anthropology that calls for 
commitment to human dignity" ("A New Phase in the Reception of Vatican II: Twenty 
Years of Interpretation of the Council," in The Reception of Vatican II, ed. Giuseppe 
Alberigo et al. [Washington: Catholic University of America, 1987] 27-43, at 34). 
68
 Gaudium et spes; see Flannery translation, Vatican Council II 903-1001. 
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ciliar reflections on faith analyzed belief and atheism more subtly and 
in reference to the Church as subject.69 Though sustaining an interest 
in the interior source of faith and atheism, he looked primarily to their 
ecclesiological meaning. He gave qualified consent to "the theme of the 
belief of the unbeliever" and uthe anonymous Christian.,, 'There is," he 
came to see, "the theme of implicit faith . . . in a l l . . . of good wi l l . . . in 
all . . . who are animated by the spirit of love."70 This issued in the 
ecclesiological conclusion that the Church remains semper refor-
manda, not only in individual members reforming their moral lives but 
in the Church as a whole in its life, teaching, and practice of faith. 
Cooperation with God's plan of salvation versus resistence to it, belief 
or unbelief, contend continually within the Church, not only in indi-
vidual members here and there. 
Murray's preconciliar fundamental theology yields a significant con-
sequence when understood in light of conciliar anthropology. The Pas-
toral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World presents the 
main conciliar doctrine on the person, but many other documents, 
especially the Declaration on Religious Liberty, make a contribution. 
Together these two texts provide an adequate statement of the coun-
cil's teaching on the human person as imago Dei.71 The latter can be 
read in reference to Murray's theology of faith no less than to his social 
ethics. The result is that the voluntareity of faith can be seen to involve 
human dignity. 
With the Declaration on Religious Liberty the council gave official 
approval to a theme of modern culture which had been insufficiently 
appreciated in the Church. The bishops accepted as of God a typically 
modern consciousness of human dignity that for several hundred years 
69
 See Murray, "Religious Freedom and the Atheist," in Hooper, Bridging 255-65, and 
"The Unbelief of the Christian," ibid. 266-78. Both postconciliar texts were published 
posthumously. Their chronological order is difficult to determine. When did Murray 
move from a polemical to a dialogical stance with atheism? Hooper finds grounds in The 
Problem of God for the shift to "a search for common theological ground with modern 
atheism" ("Theological Sources of John Courtney Murray's Ethics" 41). True, Murray 
paid grudging tribute to modern atheism for having "stated with rather appalling clar-
ity, in a phrase calculated to shock us into awareness of its urgency... that God is dead" 
(The Problem of God 120); but this is less than a search for common ground. Also, 
Murray's "The Right to Unbelief ' denies that atheists have a civil right to propagandize 
for their view; this brief essay appeared as "Le droit à Pincroyance," Relations [Montreal] 
22 (April 1962) 91-92 and is reproduced in Hooper, Bridging 231-36. Thus Murray 
developed his final views on atheism after Vatican II, not before. 
70
 Murray, "The Unbelief of the Christian," in Hooper, Bridging 272. 
71
 Murray did not develop the theme, but he did remark that the "first thing the Bible 
has to say about man is that he was made in the image of God" ("Freedom in the Age of 
Renewal," in Hooper, Bridging 183). And he understood this to mean inalienable, free 
self-possession and self-determination as the human prerogative making religion and 
morality possible. He referred to Aquinas's teaching that "Man . . . *is made in the image 
of God'; and by image is here meant that man is intelligent, free in his power of choice, 
and of himself the master of himself... the active source of what he does" (ibid. 183); he 
added that this drew upon a view common to John Damascene and the Greek Fathers. 
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in the West had energized demands for religious liberty and, at least in 
England and the U.S., for limited, constitutional government.72 Mod-
ern consciousness of the dignity of the person grasped a truth "known 
through the revealed word of God and by reason itself."73 The Decla-
ration, together with the Pastoral Constitution, gave new standing to 
human dignity as a theme in the life and mission of Catholicism, 
though in substance if not in terminology it had long been a part of the 
Church's social teaching. At a minimum the two documents clarified 
the basis for subsequent ecclesial and papal commitment to the hu-
man-rights agenda and placed that commitment on common ground 
with all who struggle for human dignity and human rights. Moreover, 
the affirmation of human dignity illuminated other doctrines, so that 
the processes of renewal transmit that affirmation in many pastoral 
accents, from respect for the mission and role of the laity to liturgical 
renewal in the direction of active participation and social ministries 
promoting human rights. The argument is that the council's commit-
ment to human dignity has a profound effect on the contingent ele-
ment in love for God that moves faith. The council initiated a renewal 
in the very act of believing as well as refined elements in the content 
believed.74 This occurred because conciliar orientation to human dig-
nity modifies the meaning of the creaturely love for God internal to 
faith. 
The key to conciliar teaching on the Creator-creature relationship 
and the dignity of the human creature is the theme of the imago Dei. 
Anthony Erhueh does not hesitate to say that the uimago Dei is the 
basis and foundation of human dignity" in the Pastoral Constitution.75 
Its first chapter presents God as the Creator whose imago are the 
socially related persons whose dignity is spelled out in some of its main 
elements by the chapter. The Declaration on Religious Liberty grounds 
religious liberty in that dignity. While the imago Dei motif is undoubt-
edly the key to the anthropology of the Pastoral Constitution, its co-
herence has been under review. Discussion turns on the difference 
between a creation-centered and a christocentric account of humanity 
72
 Murray understood this "modern consciousness" as an emergent grasp of the natu-
ral law and as a prompting of reason; see The Problem of Religious Freedom 17-19. 
73
 Declaration on Religious Liberty; see Flannery translation, Vatican Council II800. 
74
 M. Basil Pennington finds that the Declaration on Religious Liberty summons be-
lievers onto a path out of acedia, "an insidious spiritual sloth" against which the early 
Church too had struggled. He points to the exhortation, "Let them form [people] too who 
will be lovers of true freedom . . . , who will come to decisions on their own judgment and, 
in light of truth, govern their activities with a sense of responsibility . . . willing always 
to join with others in cooperative effort" (Vatican II: We've Only Just Begun [New York: 
Crossroad, 1994] 8). This conciliar exhortation, he observes, invites Catholics to personal 
development in their faith. 
75
 Vatican II: Image of God in Man (Rome: Urbaniana University, 1987) 188. 
76
 See Walter Kasper, "The Theological Anthropology of Gaudium et Spes," Communio 
23 (1996) 129-40; and David L. Schindler, "Christology and the Imago Dei: Interpreting 
Gaudium et Spes" Communio 23 (1996) 156-84. 
 at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 16, 2016tsj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND POSTCONCILIAR FAITH 505 
(nos. 12 and 22). Are they integrated? Do they generate alternative 
visions of postconciliar Catholicism? Schindler has argued that they 
do. It seems more likely, however, that the Christology of no. 22 relies 
upon "a theological conception which assumes the unity of the orders of 
creation and redemption in salvation history/' as Kasper says,77 than 
that sections 12 and 22 of the Pastoral Constitution stand in irrecon-
cilable tension.78 Yet absence of a fully conceptualized theological syn-
thesis does not stem necessarily from a conflicted faith-understanding. 
Agreement by the Church on which books constituted the canon of 
the New Testament, for instance, expressed its recognition of a basic 
harmony among Christologies as diverse as those of Mark, Matthew, 
Luke, and John. Nor did Nicaea, Constantinople, and Chalcedon state 
a complete synthesis of all christological tendencies in the New Testa-
ment. On this and other bases there is reason to doubt the hermeneuti-
cal principle that a significant theological difference has to be con-
ceived first and last as the product and source of irremediable theo-
logical conflict. For that reason it seems gratuitous for Schindler to 
contend that the difference between nos. 12 and 22 generates a post-
conciliar antithesis between a christocentric theology of creation 
adopted by Pope John Paul II and a "theistic" view lending itself to an 
unhappy alliance between "Anglo-American liberalism and conciliar 
Catholicism."79 His uneasiness about certain emphases in the 
Church's teaching may nonetheless highlight the need for further 
thought and synthesis. But his exposition has not argued conclusively 
either that there is conflict between nos. 12 and 22 in the Pastoral 
Constitution or that the difference has generated division in postcon-
ciliar American Catholicism. That a difference in textual foci might 
express a real though unformulated unity receives no consideration. 
Yet why cannot those two sections witness to a faith-understanding 
whose comprehensive unity is real (both are scriptural) but which may 
elude conceptual synthesis in this (or any) text? The unity immanent 
in the multitude of deeds and words in divine salvation and revelation 
is real, but that is not the same as saying that the Church's theological 
understanding of it at any given time (or ever) will be more than a 
deepening grasp of a whole which remains an asymptotic goal for the-
ology. The whole has not yet been historically realized either. 
Therefore the assumption will be made here that the council does not 
teach a divided and divisive anthropology in the Pastoral Constitution 
nor, in conjunction with it, in the Declaration on Religious Liberty. 
Coherence in conciliar anthropology but not necessarily a single, clear, 
synthetic concept will be presumed in what follows. According to both 
sections of the Pastoral Constitution, the proto-human pair in Genesis 
Kasper, "The Theological Anthropology of Gaudium et Spes" 137. 
Schindler, "Christology and the Imago Dei" 156-59. 
Ibid. 166. 
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1-2 were created in the image of God the Creator (imago Dei).80 The 
council clearly adopts a relational understanding of the imago. It puts 
behind it past designations of reason or dominion as the most God-like 
attribute and so as the seat of human likeness to God. Instead, the 
council presents the imago, as Joseph Ratzinger early observed, in 
three relationships. First and foremost, an openness for companion-
ship with God in which a person, "stands in immediate relation to God 
. . . [and] does not have to do with God indirectly through . . . work and 
. . . relations with . . . fellow [human beings]. Immediacy in relating 
to God is essential to the imago Dei.82 The immediacy comes to expres-
sion directly in reverence for and obedience to God. But it also gives 
rise to profound community between man and woman and to a rela-
tionship with earth that shares in divine dominion on behalf of divine 
care for creation. It is not one or another attribute or aspect that 
expresses likeness to their Creator, but the whole existence of the 
proto-pair. 
The imago Dei is realized in a proto-pair of deeply related human 
persons, not in a set of monads unencumbered by the givenness of God, 
their community, and earth. In that sense the imago Dei is not com-
plete in one self as if one human being by himself was the imago. 
Rather the likeness to God of any person exists within a generic like-
ness shared by family (society, human species) and expressed in rela-
tion to earth (cosmos). Adam and Eve are not, then, simply two indi-
viduals at the beginning of a series of further individuals but precisely 
symbolic and representative of all humanity. 
The protological imago of the Pastoral Constitution no. 12 is not 
negated or contradicted but fulfilled by the advent of Christ who is the 
foremost and eschatological image of the God of Israel. Only in Christ, 
Alpha and Omega, are humans revealed to themselves. "For Adam, the 
first man, was a type of him who was to come."83 The truths about 
human dignity enunciated in Chapter 1 of the Pastoral Constitution 
and by the Declaration on Religious Liberty find their "source and their 
most perfect embodiment" in Christ.84 Christ restored to humanity a 
likeness to God disfigured by sin. Participation in Christ does more 
80
 Gaudium et spes no. 22 speaks about "Adam, the first man" and declares that "all 
the truths mentioned so far [in Chapter 1, including no. 12] should find in him [Christ] 
their source and most perfect embodiment." Among "all the truths" is the meaning of the 
dignity of the human person announced in the very title to Chapter 1, "The Dignity of the 
Human Person," which no. 22 brings to a conclusion. 
81
 Joseph Ratzinger, "The Dignity of the Human Person," in Commentary on the Docu-
ments of Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler, vol. 5 (London: Burns & Oates, 1969) 123. 
82
 Luis Ladaria, S.J., warns against restricting conciliar doctrine on humanity "in 
God's image" to a theology of creation alone, since as Irenaeus taught, "Adam does not 
explain Christ; Christ explains Adam." (humanity in the Light of Christ in the Second 
Vatican Council," in Vatican II Assessment and Perspectives: Twenty-five Years after 
(1962-1987), ed. René Latourelle [New York: Paulist, 1989] 386-401, at 390). 
83
 Gaudium et spes no. 22. 
84
 Gaudium et spes also states that "Christ, . . . in the very revelation of the mystery 
of the Father and his love, fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high 
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than grant believers a new soteriological status; it inserts them into a 
dynamic process wherein the Spirit conforms the Church and believers 
to Christ. Consequently, the teaching on human dignity in the Decla-
ration on Religious Liberty and the Pastoral Constitution supports the 
following inference. Human dignity, personal conscience, and a right-
ful autonomy underlying religious liberty belong to the dependent 
creaturely condition established through and in view of Christ. 
Because the imago Dei, according to conciliar teaching, has personal 
dignity, relational autonomy, and the right to religious liberty, these 
aspects of human existence are recognized as coming from and in some 
way serving as a path to the Creator. Conciliar amplification of mean-
ing for the imago expands practical knowledge of the Creator who is 
loved unto belief. The knowledge enters into the voluntareity of ha-
bitual faith. Entry occurs by assimilation of the effects from conciliar 
renewal and, to the extent that it occurs, by familiarity with the con-
ciliar doctrine. God is loved as source and last end not solely of con-
tingent existents, cosmic order, and all legitimate authority, but above 
all of intrinsically worthy human existence. Conciliar orientation to 
human dignity imparts a new quality to reverent love (pia affectio) for 
the Creator internal to the habit of faith. Affirmation of human dignity 
characterizes the believer's self-understanding and awareness of the 
Creator. This respecified pia affectio within the interiority of faith 
begins to guide faith-understanding and the life of faith along ways 
respectful of conscience, personal dignity, relational autonomy and, in 
society, religious liberty. This is faith being true to its renewed vol-
untary dynamic. 
The habit of faith becomes, while also responding to the Word of God, 
a hearing of the believer's own existence—but not as if in isolation from 
others or from the physical cosmos—as a created word of God. Of 
course, this hearing is indirect in comparison with the material object 
of faith, that is, the gospel believed, preached, and taught by the 
Church. This hearing of creation within believing the gospel is how 
Vatican II initiated and continues to support a profound integration of 
the reality of the imago Dei into the voluntary dynamic of habitual 
faith. The voluntareity of postconciliar faith is a love for God ascending 
calling" (no. 22). This statement, Schindler notes "repeats almost verbatim a statement 
by Henri de Lubac in Catholicism (1938)" and "offers the best way into the pope's [John 
Paul IPs] view of the autonomy of creation" ("Religious Freedom, Truth and American 
Liberalism" 704). In order to prevent any implication of polarity with, e.g., Karl Rahner's 
theology, it should be noted that Rahner's transcendental christology involves a chris-
tocentric anthropology; see The Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the 
Idea of Christianity, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury, 1978). 
85
 Pope John Paul II teaches a gentle reverence for the human mind seeking truth. He 
encourages Catholics to await the next millennium with repentent humility for any past 
irreverence the Church has shown to persons in their search for truth. "Another painful 
chapter of history to which the sons and daughters of the Church must return with a 
spirit of repentence," he reminds us, "is that of acquiescence given, especially in certain 
centuries, to intolerance and even violence in the service of truth" (Tertio millenio adve-
niente [Vatican City: Vatican City Press, 1994] nos. 35, 41; emphasis in the original). 
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from respect for our common humanity that has eyes open to its dignity 
as imago Dei. 
As a result, faith after Vatican II, more than faith after Vatican I. 
has become a performed participation in the truth of human dignity.8 
This is why the spiritual life of faith has an ecclesiastically mediated 
impetus toward personal appropriation of the imago Dei. The grace of 
faith, we are reminded by Murray's fundamental theology, evokes a 
love for the Creator as last end that simultaneously is an act of human 
self-recognition and personal dedication to God. The pilgrimage of 
faith, consequently, brings a gradual, faith-inspired appropriation of a 
believer's own participation in the imago Dei precisely as a concomi-
tant to deepening faith.87 The grace of faith blesses the creational 
conferral of (limited) authority for personal self-direction. Within the 
renewal of habitual faith under the renewing impulse of the council 
there takes place a loving obedience to the Creator as first cause and 
last end in hearing the creational word of God pronounced in the lan-
guage of the teleological structure and intrinsic dignity of the human 
person. 
If my hypothesis on Vatican II and faith is sound, one can conclude 
that the work of the Holy Spirit in conciliar renewal produces an un-
official, often inconspicuous, but personal appropriation of human dig-
nity within the dynamic of habitual Catholic faith. This result, which 
may appear as consciousness of moral agency, stems not primarily 
from compliance with the valuable external teaching of the magiste-
riurn on the importance of human dignity, nor from adherence to lib-
eral ideology, but from creaturely acceptance of the inner word on 
human dignity in the voluntareity of faith itself. The immanence of 
that word in ordinary faith is a reason for saying that Catholic faith is 
inseparable from the Church's commitment to fostering the realization 
of human dignity through respect for human rights. According to this 
view, then, the Church's postconciliar commitment to the human-
rights agenda springs from a graced love for the Creator, educated into 
new appreciation for the imago Dei, moving the assent of faith. 
86
 In historical-theological perspective, observes Avery Dulles, the understanding of 
faith at "Vatican II did not directly follow in the line of development that stretches from 
the Council of Trent, through Vatican I and the anti-Modernist documents to Humani 
generis. Without contradicting this recent tradition Vatican II took a more personalist, 
vitalist approach . . . " {Assurance 139). 
87
 The recent catechism incorporates conciliar affirmation of human dignity into its 
teaching on faith when it states that " 'believing' is a human act, conscious and free, 
corresponding to the dignity of the human person" (The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church no. 180 [Liguori, Mo.: Liguori, 1994] 48). That statement leads the way to further 
consideration of faith and dignity. The catechism adds that " 'believing' is an ecclesial 
act. The Church's faith precedes, engenders, supports, and nourishes our faith. The 
Church is the mother of all believers" (no. 181, ibid.) This does not mean that the 
Church's faith substitutes for the act of belief by members, as if they had no real access 
to God through the Church but access only to the Church which could believe on their 
behalf. The Church understands the condition of faith in an infant receiving baptism as 
a temporary, initial reality which the dynamic of faith urges into development. The 
relation to God in a baptized infant cannot be taken as a norm. 
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